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Abstract
This paper analyzes optimal capital taxation in open economies with strategic interaction
in a neo-classical growth model. With a territorial or source-based tax system, I show that
optimal capital taxes in steady state are zero for a large open economy, thereby generalizing the
result previously established only for the special cases of a closed and a small open economy.
If the steady-state assumption is relaxed, optimal capital taxes are still zero when marginal
utilities of private and public consumption are bounded, or when the utility function is quasi-
linear in consumption. Moreover, in the latter case the solution is also time-consistent. For
the residential or world-wide tax principle, however, countries are not able to tax all factors
of production, so capital income taxes are generally non-zero except in the limiting cases of a
closed or small open economy. Allowing for both residential and territorial taxes restores zero
capital taxes.
JEL Classification: H21, E62
Keywords: Dynamic Optimal Taxation, Open Economy, Ramsey Taxation, Capital Taxes
1 Introduction
The taxation of capital is an important and hotly debated policy issue, also within the economics
profession. Diamond and Saez (2011) for instance argue in favor of significantly positive capital
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taxes, whereas Mankiw, Weinzierl, and Yagan (2009) contend that they should be set to zero. The
argument for zero capital taxes is mostly based on the findings of Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985)
for a closed economy. The world today, though, is not well described by a closed economy; capital
is highly mobile between countries. Does the argument for zero capital taxes change in an open
economy? Correia (1996a) extends the result to a small open economy. But the literature so far has
abstracted “from interesting strategic issues that arise when more than one authority sets taxes,
and [. . . ] from general equilibrium linkages between an economy’s fiscal policy and world prices.”
(Chari and Kehoe, 1999, p.66)
A closed and a small open economy are the limiting cases of a large open economy, where the
relative mass of the home economy compared to the world economy is one and zero, respectively. If
optimal capital taxes are zero in both the extremes of a closed and a small open economy, one could
think that the intermediate case of a large open economy would yield the same result. But there is a
reason why capital taxes could be zero only in the limiting cases: a large economy can influence the
world interest rate and thus shift some of the tax burden on foreigners as well as directly tax their
capital employed in the home country, see for example Ha and Sibert (1997).1 Furthermore, the
observation by (Chari and Kehoe, 1999, pp.40-41) that “zero capital income taxation in the steady
state is optimal if the extra constraints do not depend on the capital stock” does not necessarily
hold in a large open economy with strategic interaction.
In this paper, I take the conventional framework of a neo-classical economy and perfect commit-
ment to analyze optimal capital taxation in a large open economy. The common primal approach
of finding optimal allocations by eliminating taxes from the problem is not easily applicable here,
since taxes abroad are taken as given (see the appendix for further details). I use best-response
functions of a one-shot game between governments for a given belief of policies abroad to determine
optimal policy. I find that with a territorial tax system, in which capital is taxed according to where
it is employed and not where it originates from, optimal capital taxes are zero in the long run. With
a residential tax system, where capital taxes are paid where the owner resides, optimal capital taxes
are generally not zero.2
1They use an overlapping generations framework with time-consistent taxes and inelastic labor supply and find
that corporate taxes (territorial taxes in this model) are optimally positive for capital importers and negative for
exporters, in line with earlier results from static models.
2In this model best-response functions are not easily interpreted in steady state for residential taxes, since these
need to equalize across countries in the long run, as shown by Razin and Sadka (1991). I therefore limit the analysis
to symmetric countries when studying residential taxes.
2
The zero capital tax result hinges on a complete tax system, i.e. that all factors of production
can be taxed, see for instance Correia (1996b) and Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1997). This condition
is not met when taxes are paid according to where the owner resides (as foreign capital investment
cannot be taxed) and the optimal tax is indeed no longer zero in this case. When one allows for both
residential and territorial taxes at the same time, the tax system is complete again and effective
capital taxes are zero.3 Neither territorial nor residential taxes need to be zero, but the after-tax
returns are optimally set to be equal to the pre-tax returns. That is, as long as governments can
levy source-based taxes (whether in combination with other taxes or not), the zero-tax result holds
in an open economy.
The interaction between governments is modeled as a one-shot generalized game. In conse-
quence, only the equilibrium is feasible. In order to allow off-equilibrium behavior to be feasible,
I propose an alternative framework where each country’s labor taxes (or capital taxes) adjust to
balance the government budget constraint for given bond issuance and capital tax (or labor tax)
decisions. Capital taxes are still zero in the long run, even when other governments do not be-
have optimally. This framework also permits to consider mixed-strategy equilibria; these are all
characterized by zero capital taxes. To ensure that governments are not restricted by the Laffer
curve, government expenditures can be endogenized (so that the set of feasible strategies is always
non-empty for all foreign strategies) without changing results.
Results are robust with respect to (i) the size of the economy compared to the rest of the world
and the number of countries; (ii) differences between countries regarding the production technology,
government outlays, and utility function parameters;4 (iii) the inclusion of capital adjustment costs,
which one could interpret as barriers to capital mobility; (iv) agent heterogeneity regarding initial
wealth and labor productivity, coupled with non-linear labor income taxation; (v) the availability
of consumption taxes.
The steady-state assumption can also be relaxed: Following Judd (1999), I show that if the
marginal utilities of public and private consumption are bounded, then average intertemporal dis-
tortions will be zero in the long run. Another alternative to a steady state is to assume that
the marginal utility of consumption cannot be influenced, for example with a quasi-linear utility
3This corresponds to the empirically relevant case where corporate income taxes are source-based and capital
income taxes are residence-based.
4The time discount factor is an exception. When discounting differs across countries, a steady state or stable
long-run average does not exist.
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function. In this case the problem of time inconsistency, as pointed out by Kydland and Prescott
(1977), also disappears.
In contrast to the tax competition literature, starting with Wilson (1986), zero capital taxes
are not caused by a race to the bottom, since they are independent of the size of the country or
the barriers to capital mobility. In a related paper, Gross (2012), I discuss tax competition in
a neo-classical framework of optimal taxation in detail. I study cases where it is optimal to tax
capital in a closed economy and how these optimal taxes are affected when the economy is open.
I find that with an endogenous capital stock, capital in the long run is an intermediate good, and
therefore does not generate any rents which a government would like to capture. If however the
global capital stock is exogenously given, as commonly assumed in the literature, then it is optimal
to tax capital as much as possible in a closed economy (this is equivalent to a lump-sum tax) and
the degree of openness limits a government’s ability to capture the rents from capital.
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows: in the next section I set up the model and
provide a proof of the zero capital tax result in a large open economy. The third section discusses
the robustness of the result. In the subsequent section, I analyze residential taxation and a hybrid
system. The last section concludes. The appendix discusses the primal approach and consumption
taxes in a large open economy and contains proofs.
2 Territorial tax system
The model consists of two countries,5 between which capital can be freely shifted, whereas labor
is immobile. Barriers to capital mobility do not affect results, see section 3.6. Without loss of
generality, I abstract from population and productivity growth. A stationary transformation is
possible here, as in Mendoza and Tesar (2005). As in their paper, exogenous growth means that tax
policy can only have level effects but does not affect long-term growth. For simplicity, depreciation
is not considered but could easily be incorporated. I will first analyze one country and discuss some
of the conditions that have to hold in the other country later. Variables with a star denote foreign
quantities or prices. In this section, I first briefly describe the agents of the model, then define the
game between governments and agents, and last prove that optimal capital taxes are zero in steady
state.
5It is easy to extend the model to any number of countries. For ease of exposition, I will limit myself to the case
of two countries.
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2.1 Agents
The setup is standard, there is a continuum of identical households6 and firms and a government
populating each country. Heterogeneous agents who differ in labor productivity and wealth do not
affect results, see section 3.7.
2.1.1 Households
The representative agent takes prices as given and maximizes lifetime utility over an infinite horizon:
∞∑
t=0
βtu(ct, lt), (1)
where u(ct, lt) is a well-behaved utility function over consumption ct and leisure lt. β ∈ (0, 1) is
the discount factor. It should be noted that most parameters can differ between countries, but the
discount factor has to be the same for a steady state to exist. For now I assume that a steady state
does exist, as in Atkeson, Chari, and Kehoe (1999) and Jones, Manuelli, and Rossi (1997). This
assumption can be relaxed - see sections 3.1 and 3.2. The household has one unit of time at its
disposal every period, which can be used for labor nt and leisure. The per-period budget constraint
is:
ct =(1− τnt )wtnt + [1 + (1− τkt )rt]kt − kt+1+ (2)
[1 + (1− τk∗t )r∗t ]at − at+1 + (1 +Rt)bt − bt+1.
bt are government bonds and Rt is the interest rate on them.
7 kt is the amount of capital owned
domestically, at is the capital that the household owns abroad, wt and rt are the domestic wage and
interest rate. a0, k0, and b0 are exogenously given. Finally, τ
n
t and τ
k
t are the tax rates on wages
and capital, respectively. Taxes on capital are territorial, that is they are paid where the capital is
employed, independent of the citizenship of the owner.
Optimal behavior implies a no-arbitrage condition, that the returns on government bonds and
6Without loss of generality I assume that the measure of households is one for the home country. The relative
size of the other country is χ.
7For notational simplicity, I assume that the income on government bonds remains untaxed; in this context, it is
equivalent to the assumption that all bonds are held domestically. Allowing them to be held by foreigners (and that
income on bonds is taxed) does not change results.
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capital in both countries must be equal after taxes,
Rt+1 = r
∗
t+1(1− τk∗t+1) = rt+1(1− τkt+1), (3)
as well as the familiar conditions concerning the trade-off between consumption versus leisure and
consumption today versus tomorrow:
ul(t) =uc(t)(1− τnt )wt (4)
uc(t) =βuc(t+ 1)[(1− τkt+1)rt+1 + 1] (5)
uc(t) =βuc(t+ 1)[(1− τk∗t )r∗t+1 + 1]. (6)
Subscripts refer to derivatives with respect to that variable, e.g. uc(t) is the derivative of the utility
function with respect to consumption at time t.
The foreign agent’s household optimization problem is a mirror image of the domestic one’s. a∗t
is the total amount of capital employed abroad that is owned by foreigners and k∗t is capital from
abroad that is in use domestically. In order to keep all variables in per-capita terms, I divide them
by country size χ.
c∗t /χ =(1− τn∗t )w∗t n∗t /χ+ [1 + (1− τk∗t )r∗t ]a∗t /χ− a∗t+1/χ+ (7)
[1 + (1− τkt )rt]k∗t /χ− k∗t+1/χ+ (1 +R∗t )b∗t /χ− b∗t+1/χ.
2.1.2 Firms
Output is produced by a representative firm with the private inputs labor nt and capital Kt = kt+k
∗
t
according to a production function f(K,n) with constant returns to scale that satisfies the Inada
conditions (total capital employed abroad is given by A∗t = at + a
∗
t ). Output is the numeraire and
is used for consumption, capital, and government expenditures. The firm rents capital from private
agents (no matter from which country) and hires labor from domestic citizens, taking factor prices
as given. The maximization of profit, along with constant returns to scale implies zero profits and
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the following remunerations for the inputs:
rt =FK(t) (8)
wt =Fn(t). (9)
2.1.3 The Government
The benevolent government’s objective is to maximize the utility of its citizens. It needs to finance
an exogenous stream of unproductive expenditures {gt}∞, which converges to a constant g after
some finite time to allow for a steady state. Revenue is generated by distortionary taxes on capital
earnings τkt and wages τ
n
t . Capital taxes have to be announced one period in advance, so τ
k
0 is
given.8 I assume that the government is always able to finance its expenditures with these taxes
and also by labor taxes alone, i.e. that it is not at a corner solution. This assumption is relaxed
in section 3.5 when government expenditures are endogenous. The government may trade in one-
period bonds, with bt denoting the total outstanding government debt. A no-Ponzi condition has
to hold to avoid an infinite debt build-up. The government’s per-period budget constraint can be
written as
gt + bt(1 +Rt) = τ
k
t rtKt + τ
n
t wtnt + bt+1. (10)
2.2 Game between Agents
As is standard in the taxation literature, the government moves first and announces its tax schedule,
whereupon households (and firms) react to this. Each single household and firm has measure zero,
so a competitive equilibrium defines the second stage. In an open economy, there are not only
domestic households, but also their counterparts abroad, which are affected by domestic policies.
Agents in both countries act simultaneously.
The first stage consists of a one-shot game between the two governments which announce their
tax schedules at the same time. This sub-game can be seen as a generalized game (much like the
second stage if the competitive equilibrium is viewed as the outcome of a game between infinitely
8The government is otherwise potentially able to finance its complete stream of expenditures by expropriating the
initial capital stock. This acts as a lump-sum tax, since capital at time zero is taken as given and was accumulated
without regard to the newly announced tax structure. However, even if one allowed for lump-sum taxes, optimal
steady state capital taxes would not be affected (although the result then becomes trivial).
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many agents) in the spirit of Debreu (1952).9 That is, feasible strategies depend on the actions
taken by the other player. The government chooses its bond issues and taxes for all periods subject
to its budget constraint. Foreign taxes and bond issues are taken as given (that is, each government
decides upon its optimal plan of action for a given belief of what the other does). All other variables
(the households’ and firms’ choices) are reaction functions to the tax schedule announced by the
home and foreign government.
Definition 1 (Admissible Policy) An admissible policy is a sequence of capital taxes {τkt }∞t=1,
labor taxes {τnt }∞t=0, and bond issues {bt}∞t=1 for a given belief of foreign policy {τk∗t+1, τn∗t , b∗t+1}∞t=0
such that the government budget constraint holds every period and that the allocations of consump-
tion, labor supply, and bond and capital holdings at home and abroad satisfy
1. agents maximizing utility subject to their budget constraints, taking prices and taxes as given;
2. firms maximizing profits, taking prices as given.
The government can consider the households’ choice variables as control variables when it in-
corporates the optimality conditions and budget constraints of the households.10 I can therefore
reformulate the government’s problem as a social planner’s function, subject to a set of constraints
as laid out above. These are the government budget constraint (10), the household’s budget con-
straint (2), and the household’s conditions (4), (5) and (6). Additionally, it is kept in mind that
input prices r and w are equal to their marginal products, taking into account firms’ profit max-
imization. These conditions have to be satisfied not only for the home country, but also abroad
(except for the foreign government’s budget constraint). The set of control variables is
X = {ct, c∗t , nt, n∗t , kt+1, k∗t+1, at+1, a∗t+1, bt+1, τkt+1, τnt }∞t=0. (11)
The government’s Lagrangean (with multipliers ψ, θ, µ, ζ and γ respectively for the constraints
mentioned above, with an asterisk for the constraints abroad) is then (not showing the transversality
9The original paper considers only finite spaces, but a more general proof is, for instance, provided in Tian (1992).
10I assume an interior solution to the household’s problem here: This is true when the utility function is strictly
increasing and concave in both of its arguments, consumption and leisure, when the production function satisfies the
Inada conditions, and when taxes are restricted to be bounded and strictly smaller than one. I also assume that
initial government debt and the stream of government expenditures are low enough so that the government is able
to finance its expenditures at any time through labor taxes, so that it is not restricted by the top of the Laffer curve.
Instead of assuming this, one can also endogenize government expenditures, see section 3.
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conditions)
L =
∞∑
t=0
βt{u(ct, lt) (12)
+ψt[τ
k
t rtKt + τ
n
t wtnt − bt(1 + (1− τkt )rt) + bt+1 − gt]
+θt[(1− τnt )wtnt + [1 + (1− τkt )rt]kt − kt+1 + (1 + (1− τk∗t )r∗t )at − at+1+
(1 + (1− τkt )rt)bt − bt+1 − ct]
+µt[uc(t)(1− τnt )wt − ul(t)]
+ζt|t>0
[
(rt(1− τkt ) + 1)− uc(t− 1)/(βuc(t))
]
+γt|t>0
[
(r∗t (1− τk∗t ) + 1)− uc(t− 1)/(βuc(t))
]
+θ∗t /χ[(1− τn∗t )w∗t n∗t + (1 + (1− τk∗t )r∗t )a∗t − a∗t+1 + (1 + (1− τkt )rt)k∗t − k∗t+1+
(1 + (1− τk∗t )r∗t )b∗t − b∗t+1 − c∗t ]
+µ∗t [u
∗
c(t)(1− τn∗t )w∗t − u∗l (t)]
+ζ∗t|t>0
[
(r∗t (1− τk∗t ) + 1)− u∗c(t− 1)/(βu∗c(t))
]
+γ∗t|t>0
[
(rt(1− τt)k + 1)− u∗c(t− 1)/(βu∗c(t))
]}.
Optimal policy for each government is when it chooses the best action that is admissible for any
belief of what the other does:
Definition 2 (Optimal Response Function) An optimal response function is the admissible
policy maximizing the agent’s discounted lifetime utility for each belief of foreign policy.
A strategy specifies the action taken at each information node of a game; since it is a one-shot
game, a strategy corresponds to choosing a policy. Following from this definition, I will now turn
to an equilibrium for an open economy. For the moment I only consider pure strategies, since
off-equilibrium feasibility is not guaranteed (see below). In section 3.4 I discuss how the game
can be defined differently, so that off-equilibrium behavior is feasible, allowing for mixed-strategy
equilibria. In section 3.5 I endogenize government spending to ensure that an optimal response
always exists.
Definition 3 (Pure Strategy Open Economy Equilibrium) A pure strategy open economy
equilibrium is a sequence of prices {wt, rt, w∗t , r∗t , Rt, R∗t }∞t=0, government policies {τnt , τn∗t , τkt+1, τk∗t+1, bt+1, b∗t+1}∞t=0,
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and allocations {ct, c∗t , nt, n∗t , kt+1, k∗t+1, at+1, a∗t+1}∞t=0 that follows from a set of equilibrium strate-
gies and private sector equilibrium conditions such that:11
1. each government’s equilibrium strategy is an optimal response to the other governments’ equi-
librium strategy;
2. agents in all countries choose consumption, labor supply, and bond and capital holdings to
maximize their utility subject to their budget constraint, taking prices and taxes as given;
3. firms in all countries maximize profits, taking prices as given.
The set of admissible policies depends on the beliefs of the other player’s policy. An admissible
policy for one government for a given belief of the other government’s policy can result in the latter
not being admissible. The corresponding allocation is thus not feasible, i.e. it does not satisfy
the global resource constraint. This is not a problem from a game-theoretic point of view, it is
a generalized game as in Debreu (1952) and preferences are naturally defined over non-feasible
outcomes. However, in equilibrium beliefs and actual choices coincide, so equilibrium actions are
always feasible. In more technical terms, let xi = {bt+1, τkt+1, τnt }∞t=0 be an action for country i.
Call fi(xj) the set of admissible actions for country i when country j plays xj . Let xi(xj) be the
optimal response function for country i given that it believes country j will play xj . In equilibrium,
beliefs and actual choices are equal; let x∗i = xi(x
∗
j ) be the equilibrium action. If country j plays
some xˆj ∈ fj(x∗i ), then x∗i is probably not optimal anymore. However, it is also likely that it is not
admissible (and thus feasible) anymore, i.e. that x∗i /∈ fi(xˆj). Since equilibrium strategies satisfy
x∗i ∈ fi(x∗j ) and x∗j ∈ fj(x∗i ), they are always feasible (both governments’ equilibrium choices are
admissible, meaning that they satisfy the household and government budget constraints). When
these constraints hold in each country, then the global feasibility constraint also holds in all periods:
F (Kt, nt) +Kt −Kt+1 − ct − gt + F (A∗t , n∗t ) +A∗t −A∗t+1 − c∗t − g∗t = 0. (13)
This can be verified by simply adding up the household and government budget constraints in each
country.
It is possible that there exist multiple equilibria. However, no matter what the equilibrium
outcome is, it will be characterized by zero steady-state capital taxes, as I will show in the next
11Of course the equilibrium also depends on the initial conditions, including the capital taxes at time zero.
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section. These are optimal independent of all other choices and initial conditions. It is also possible
that no pure strategy equilibrium or no steady state exists. I discuss these issues further in section 3
and provide alternative concepts which extend the result to these cases.
2.3 Zero Capital Taxes
In order to show the optimality of zero capital taxes in steady state, three first-order conditions are
relevant: those with respect to kt+1, τ
n
t , and τ
k
t .
kt|t>0 : ψtτkt rt + ψtτ
k
t Kt
∂rt
∂kt
− ψtbt(1− τkt )
∂rt
∂kt
+ ψtτ
n
t nt
∂wt
∂kt
+ θt[1 + (1− τkt )rt]+
θt(1− τkt )kt
∂rt
∂kt
+ θt(1− τnt )nt
∂wt
∂kt
+ θtbt(1− τkt )
∂rt
∂kt
+ θ∗t /χk
∗
t (1− τkt )
∂rt
∂kt
+ µtuc(t)(1− τnt )
∂wt
∂kt
+ ζt(1− τkt )
∂rt
∂kt
+ γ∗t (1− τkt )
∂rt
∂kt
= θt−1/β, (14)
τnt : ψtntwt = µtuc(t)wt + θtntwt, (15)
τkt|t>0 : ψtKtrt + ψtbtrt = θtktrt + θtbtrt + θ
∗
t /χk
∗
t rt + ζtrt + γ
∗
t rt. (16)
Substituting for ζ and µuc from equations (15) and (16) in (14), one obtains
ψtτ
k
t rt + θt[1 + (1− τkt )rt] + ψtnt
∂wt
∂kt
+ ψtKt
∂rt
∂kt
= θt−1/β. (17)
Since ∂w/∂k = Fnk and ∂r/∂k = Fkk and, due to constant returns to scale, Fnkn = −FkkK, this
simplifies to
ψtτ
k
t rt + θt[1 + (1− τkt )rt] = θt−1/β. (18)
This is the same result as in a closed economy, except that the values of the Lagrange multipliers
depend on the overall economic conditions, at home and abroad. It implies that the effect of a
higher capital stock on prices can be ignored, as long as all factors of production can be taxed
separately. From (18) it is straightforward to show that the zero-tax result holds in steady state:
Quantities, prices and multipliers are all constant over time, so one can drop time subscripts. The
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household’s Euler Equation (5) then becomes 1/β = 1 + r(1− τk) and thus
ψτkr + θ[1 + (1− τkt )rt] = θ[1 + (1− τkt )rt] (19)
⇔ ψrτk = 0. (20)
The Lagrange multiplier ψ is always positive, as is the interest rate, therefore τk = 0. This can be
summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 With source-based taxation, steady-state capital taxes are optimally zero in any
open economy equilibrium, independent of the relative size of the home economy compared to the
rest of the world. This includes the limiting points of a closed and a small open economy.
The assumption of optimal behavior by citizens abroad is important and so is the existence of a
steady state, and hence a common discount factor β. All other parameters can be different across
countries, from the production function over preferences to government outlays.
I have not explicitly included no-Ponzi conditions, so how can one be sure that governments do
not run bigger and bigger deficits? First, the results still hold when I do not allow for government
bonds. Second, a rising debt would let the multiplier of the government budget constraint increase,
which is not consistent with steady state or the assumption of a constant marginal social value of
government funds as in section 3.2.
3 Robustness
The results shown so far rely on steady state, pure strategies, and optimal behavior of all govern-
ments. It is not assured that a steady state actually exists, so I present two alternatives to the
steady state assumption. Then I discuss the implications of non-optimal behavior by other govern-
ments and introduce a different game structure, which will make off-equilibrium behavior feasible.
This also permits to analyze mixed strategy equilibria. Next, instead of assuming that government
spending is always low enough to have admissible policies, I show next how endogenous government
spending guarantees their existence. Ultimately, I briefly lay out how barriers to capital mobility
and heterogeneous agents leave the results unaffected; the proofs are relegated to the appendix.
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3.1 First-order Approximation
One way to avoid the reliance on steady state is a first-order approximation: I assume here that
an additional unit of consumption has negligible effects on the marginal utility of consumption and
leisure. This means that a marginal increase in household wealth does not change its labor-leisure
or intertemporal decision. A separable utility function (separable over time and between leisure
and consumption) that is linear in consumption obviously satisfies these conditions.12
To simplify notation, rewrite the equilibrium constraints for domestic capital (with Lagrange
multiplier ζt for t > 0) as
(1 + rt(1− τkt ))βuc(t)− uc(t− 1) = 0 (21)
and for foreign capital (with Lagrange multiplier γt for t > 0) as
r∗t (1− τk∗t )− rt(1− τkt ) = 0. (22)
The latter transformation is just adding two binding constraints and thus does not change any
results. Then take the derivative of the Lagrangian with respect to ct
θt = uc(t) + µt[ucc(t)(1− τnt )wt − ulc(t)] + ζtucc(t)(1 + rt(1− τkt ))β − ζt+1ucc(t)β. (23)
Under the above-mentioned assumption that the second-order derivatives are zero, it reduces to
θt = uc(t). Substituting this expression for dates t and t− 1 into equation (18), which I reshow for
convenience,
ψtτ
k
t rt + θt[1 + (1− τkt )rt] = θt−1/β,
one can see that
ψtτ
k
t rt + uc(t)[1 + (1− τkt )rt] = uc(t− 1)/β (24)
⇔ ψtτkt rt = uc(t− 1)/β − uc(t)[1 + (1− τkt )rt] (25)
12Generally, a quasi-linear utility function does not seem to be a reasonable assumption. However, I do believe
that it does provide some interesting insights into the taxation of the initial capital stock. Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent,
and Seppala (2002) also use a quasi-linear utility function. I assume that the Euler equation holds for t > 0, i.e. that
the initial capital stock is large enough so that the consumer can save or dis-save enough to let it hold in the next
period.
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From the household’s Euler equation (21), the right-hand side is zero:
ψtτ
k
t rt = 0, (26)
which implies zero taxes on capital income, since the marginal product of capital rt and the gov-
ernment’s budget constraint multiplier ψt are strictly positive.
Since capital taxes have to be announced one period in advance, the solution is time-consistent.
In the standard setup with decreasing marginal utility of consumption, capital taxes are initially
non-zero as they allow to tax the initial capital stock which does not react to changes in tax rates.
Households can partially avoid this tax on k0 (if τ
k
0 is exogenous or bounded enough) by reducing
k1; however, this drives up consumption and reduces marginal utility at time zero. Hence, the
ability to avoid a tax on the initial capital stock is limited by how much the marginal utility of
consumption decreases as consumption increases. With a utility function linear in consumption,
there are no such limits and it is thus impossible for the government to tax the initial capital stock.
Capital taxes are optimally set to zero at all times, even if a steady state does not exist, say because
gt does not converge.
13 I summarize it in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 When the utility function is quasi-linear in consumption and capital taxes are an-
nounced one period in advance, then capital taxes τkt+1 are zero for all t ≥ 0. Furthermore, the
solution is time-consistent.
3.2 Constant Value of Government Funds
Another alternative to steady state was proposed by Judd (1999), where he shows that a much
weaker assumption can be used to obtain a capital tax that is close to zero on average over any long
time interval. He assumes “that the marginal social value of government wealth [...] is uniformly
bounded below and above over time.” I will use a similar idea to show it in this discrete framework.
Define the marginal social value of government wealth as mt = ψt/uc(t). One could also think of it
as the marginal rate of substitution between government and private consumption.14 Assume that
13The same is also true for any standard utility function in a small open economy: the government is not able to
tax the initial capital stock, as the rate of return is fixed. This has already been shown by Correia (1996a).
14Like Judd in his Corollary 9, assume there is a public good g˜, which satisfies ucg˜ = ulg˜ = 0 and infinite marginal
utility at zero, so that g˜ > 0 in all circumstances. The first-order condition would imply ψ = ug˜ . ug˜/uc is the
marginal rate of substitution between government and private consumption. See section 3.5 for further details.
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its growth rate is zero on average over a time interval T1. This can be expressed as
1
T1
t+T1∑
i=t
mi/mi−1 = 1. (27)
If this is true, then the average distortion, or the ratio of net to gross returns, from t to T1 is zero.
To show this, take the optimal capital accumulation equation (18) and subtract ψt−1/β from both
sides:
(θt−1 − ψt−1)/β = ψtτkt rt + θt[1 + (1− τkt )rt]− ψt−1/β. (28)
The first-order condition with respect to government bonds is
(θt − ψt)[1 + (1− τkt )rt] = (θt−1 − ψt−1)/β. (29)
Plugging this into the left-hand side of (28), one obtains
(θt − ψt)[1 + (1− τkt )rt] = ψtτkt rt + θt[1 + (1− τkt )rt]− ψt−1/β. (30)
This is equivalent to
ψt(1 + rt) = ψt−1/β. (31)
Substituting for β from the household’s Euler equation (21) leads to
ψt(1 + rt) = ψt−1[1 + (1− τkt )rt]uc(t)/uc(t− 1). (32)
Now one can rearrange this to
ψt/uc(t)
ψt−1/uc(t− 1) =
1 + (1− τkt )rt
1 + rt
(33)
and, using the definition of the marginal social value of government funds, this becomes
mt
mt−1
=
1 + rt(1− τkt )
1 + rt
. (34)
15
Summing over T1 time periods and dividing by T1 yields
1
T1
t+T1∑
i=t
mi/mi−1 = 1 =
1
T1
t+T1∑
i=t
1 + ri(1− τki )
1 + ri
. (35)
Thus, distortions have to be zero on average. Here I have directly assumed that the marginal social
value of government wealth is constant on average over some time interval. If one assumes instead
that it is uniformly bounded above and below, then the average growth rate has to be zero in the
limit as the time interval grows infinitely long. As long as the value of public compared to private
funds stays constant, distortions of the capital-labor ratio are zero on average.These results can be
summarized by
Proposition 3 When the marginal rate of substitution between government and private consump-
tion does not grow on average over some time interval, then average distortions of the rate of
return over that time interval are zero. If the marginal social value of government wealth is uni-
formly bounded below and above over time, then average distortions over a time interval will go to
zero as the length of that interval tends to infinity.
3.3 Non-optimal Capital Taxes Abroad
I would like to emphasize that zero capital taxes are still optimal when the other country sets its
taxes non-optimally (i.e. not to zero). The analysis above holds no matter what the beliefs about
the other country’s actions are. Assume that capital taxes abroad are set to some strictly positive
or negative level in steady state, for example due to some political economy constraints or simply
because the other government does not behave optimally. Whatever the reason and whatever the
capital taxes abroad are, it remains optimal to set steady-state taxes to zero.
It is still necessary that anticipated and actually chosen actions coincide. So far I have assumed
(in accordance with standard game theory) that governments can perfectly anticipate actions by the
other government and do not make mistakes. That is, they are rational and know that others are
rational, that others know that they are rational and so forth. Off-equilibrium outcomes cannot be
analyzed in this framework, since when the beliefs about the other player’s actions do not coincide
with actual actions, then feasibility will be violated.
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3.4 Off-equilibrium Behavior and Mixed Strategies
As pointed out above, actions are not feasible off the equilibrium path. In order to ensure that they
still are, one has to redefine the game. Taking the other player’s actions as given does generally
not satisfy the overall feasibility requirement (i.e. the global resource constraint does not hold).
I assume that labor taxes adjust in order to satisfy the government budget constraint (and that
expenditures are sufficiently low so that this is always possible). Therefore, a country’s choices
consist only of the sequences of capital taxes {τkt+1}∞t=0 and bonds {bt+1}∞t=0, while labor taxes
adjust automatically so that the government budget constraint holds.
When the government incorporates its budget constraint into its decision problem, then it can
choose the labor tax rate, too. In a similar way, foreign taxes on labor income are also determined as
a reaction to taxes at home. They react to satisfy the foreign government’s budget constraint, thus
it is a choice variable for the government at home once the additional constraint is incorporated.
The definition of an optimal response function changes accordingly:
Definition 4 (Optimal Adjusted Response Function) An optimal adjusted response function
is a sequence of capital taxes {τkt }∞t=1 and bond issues {bt}∞t=1 for each belief of foreign policy
{τk∗t , b∗t }∞t=1 maximizing the agent’s discounted lifetime utility such that labor tax rates adjust so
that the government budget constraints hold every period at home and abroad and that the allocations
of consumption, labor supply, and bond and capital holdings at home and abroad satisfy
1. agents maximizing utility subject to their budget constraints, taking prices and taxes as given;
2. firms maximizing profits, taking prices as given.
The home government’s range of effective choices remains the same, as it can still choose the
labor tax rate when it incorporates its own budget constraint into the problem. It may also choose
the labor tax rate abroad, but has to satisfy the government budget constraint there, too. It thus
does not gain or lose any degrees of freedom. Since any feasible strategy that a foreign government
can play involves a balanced budget (allowing for debt and assuming goods cannot be discarded),
the assumption that labor taxes adjust is not problematic. Within the set of all feasible strategies,
the foreign government is not restricted in its choice.
I let labor taxes adjust since bond issues are generally not a sufficient instrument to satisfy the
intertemporal budget constraint. Adjusting capital taxes might not be sufficient for the government
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budget constraint to hold in every period, but if it does, then results remain unchanged.15 Any
combination of tax rates and bonds would increase the degrees of freedom and thus be subject
to the same criticisms as the literature on conjectural variations. The idea behind the concept I
propose is not some form of behavioral game theory but to ensure that off-equilibrium choices are
still feasible.
The planner’s problem remains the same as before, except that the foreign government’s budget
constraint now has to be included in the constraint set (with multiplier ψ∗t ) and that the foreign
labor tax rate τn∗t is now part of the control variables.
16 It is easily verified that the relevant
first-order conditions for the proof do not change, as kt+1, τ
k
t , and τ
n
t or domestic prices rt and wt
are not part of the foreign government’s budget constraint. A similar argument holds when capital
taxes adjust.
The implications for optimal long-run capital taxes are hence the same as before. Given any
belief of the foreign government’s actions, optimal capital taxes are zero. If the other player then
turns out to have played something different than expected, the home government would not want
to change its capital taxes ex-post, since the best response to any foreign policy are zero capital
taxes.
Proposition 4 For a redefined game in which labor taxes adjust in both countries to satisfy the
government budget constraint, off-equilibrium outcomes are also feasible. In such a game, capital
taxes are optimally zero in steady state, no matter whether the other government plays the equilib-
rium strategy or not. There is no ex-post incentive to change the steady-state capital tax rate after
knowing the other player’s strategy.
The concept of an adjusted response function also allows to consider mixed-strategy equilibria.
In what had been previously assumed, feasibility is only satisfied if beliefs and actions taken coincide.
Therefore, a non-degenerate mixed strategy would not be feasible. When off-equilibrium behavior is
feasible, then a mixed strategy equilibrium is, too. For any mixed strategy, the part of it specifying
long-run capital taxes will always be zero, as this is optimal no matter what the other country’s
15Mendoza and Tesar (2005) let either labor or consumption taxes adjust and obtain different results depending
on which one adjusts. This can be explained by the following factors: (i) the initial taxes are not optimal; (ii) taxes
are forced to be time-invariant; (iii) taxation of the initial capital stock is driving their results. As I show in the
appendix, the availability of consumption taxes is redundant, except for the taxation of the initial capital stock.
16If only the foreign government’s per-period budget constraint were included, but not τn∗t as an additional choice
variable, then the home government’s “optimal response” would generally be a singleton. However, when labor taxes
abroad can be chosen, that is no longer true.
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policy is.
Proposition 5 For a redefined game in which labor taxes adjust in both countries to satisfy the
government budget constraint, all mixed-strategy equilibria feature zero capital taxes in steady state.
The proof is in the appendix.
3.5 Endogenous Government Spending
So far I have assumed that the government’s set of admissible policies is always non-empty for
any belief of the other country’s policy, in other words that the exogenous stream of government
expenditures and the initial debt are sufficiently low. Alternatively, government expenditures can
be endogenous, ensuring that this is true. Assume that initial government debt is zero and that the
government can choose spending g. Let the government’s per-period objective function be v(c, l, g).
g can either be a public good which also enters the household’s utility function or it can represent
government consumption or some of both. Assume that limg→∞ vg = 0 and that limg→0 vg = ∞.
The government will thus adjust its government spending depending on the value of public funds;
specifically, it can reduce its spending when the social cost of raising tax revenues is very high. This
guarantees that an admissible policy always exists, no matter what the policy in the other country
is, while the relevant first-order conditions are not affected. To allow for off-equilibrium behavior
as in the last section, government expenditures can then adjust to satisfy the government budget
constraint, while the sequence of foreign labor and capital taxes and bonds is taken as given.
3.6 Adjustment Costs
It is a priori not clear whether the assumption of perfect capital mobility is elemental for the
result. To explore the robustness of the result in this direction, I introduce adjustment costs to
model barriers to capital mobility. Define a symmetric adjustment cost function Z(x, y) such that
Zyy = Zxx = −Zxy and Zx = Zy, where x is capital today and y capital in the next period. A
well-known example is the quadratic function δ[(kt − kt+1)/kt]2, where δ is some positive, finite
parameter.
Proposition 6 For any symmetric adjustment cost function for the capital stock in any of the
countries, optimal steady-state capital income taxes are zero.
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The proof is in the appendix.
3.7 Heterogeneous Agents
To quote from Kocherlakota (2010), the textbook on New Dynamic Public Finance (NDPF), the
biggest flaw of Ramsey taxation is: “Its key economic trade-off is that the government would like
to make the taxes nonlinear but cannot.” Unlike the NDPF, I do not introduce uncertainty (the
model is still deterministic) or private information, so I am by no means trying to address the
same questions as tackled by the NDPF. But issues of redistribution and wealth heterogeneity are
potentially important. It turns out that optimal long-run capital taxes are not affected, though:
Proposition 7 Under the assumption that agents differ in their initial capital endowments and
their time-independent labor productivity, and that the government uses a polynomial of degree
J > 0 in labor income for labor taxes and a linear tax for capital income, optimal steady-state
capital taxes are zero. This is independent of the social welfare weights for different agents.
The proof is in the appendix.
4 Residential Taxes
In a residential tax system, agents pay taxes to their home government for all capital income, no
matter where it is invested. In a hybrid system, there are corporate taxes which are paid in the
country where the capital is employed, and the remaining capital income is taxed according to the
residential system. Capital taxes have to be the same in steady state in all countries (something
already explored by Razin and Sadka (1991)). The question is then how to interpret best response
functions in steady state. Assuming that countries are symmetric, this ceases to be a problem, since
all countries will choose the same tax rates in any case.17 Long-run capital taxes in a residential
system are generally not zero. The sign and magnitude depend on a number of endogenous variables
such as the interest rate, the value of government funds, and others. The importance of this result
is not whether the sign is positive or negative, but rather that it underscores the importance of a
17Mendoza and Tesar (2005) formally define capital taxes as residential, but taxes effectively function as in a
territorial system: They assume that all domestic capital is held domestically and that international bonds are not
taxed. Correia (1996a) considers a small open economy and concludes that a steady state does not exist if tax rates
are not equal.
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complete tax system – where every factor of production can be taxed independently – for the zero
capital tax. With residential taxation, a government cannot tax domestic capital investment by
foreigners. A hybrid system, with both residential and territorial capital taxes, is complete in the
sense specified above and effective capital taxes are zero again.
4.1 Pure Residential Taxation
I proceed as before, taking taxes abroad as given, derive a best response function, and then set
residential capital taxes in both countries equal to each other to arrive at the equilibrium tax rate.
In the symmetric case, all countries would choose the same tax rates, so this is a valid approach,
but in the asymmetric case the optimal rates generally do not coincide. I will thus assume that the
countries are identical. Klein, Quadrini, and Rios-Rull (2005) derive an equilibrium for asymmetric
countries in a framework with imperfect commitment. They find the steady-state foreign net
investment that equates the two optimal rates. It is therefore possible to extend the analysis to
the case of asymmetric countries. However, this is only useful in a computational implementation,
which is beyond the scope of this paper. I leave it for future research.
To simplify the analysis I leave out government bonds, without loss of generality. The planner’s
Lagrangean is
L =
∞∑
t=0
βt{u(ct, lt) (36)
+ψt[τ
k
t rtkt + τ
k
t r
∗
t at + τ
n
t wtnt − gt]
+θt[(1− τnt )wtnt + kt[1 + rt(1− τkt )]− kt+1 + at[1 + r∗t (1− τkt )]− at+1 − ct]
+µt[uc(t)(1− τnt )wt − ul(t)]
+ζt|t>0[(rt(1− τkt ) + 1)− uc(t− 1)/(βuc(t))]
+γt|t>0[(r∗t (1− τkt ) + 1)− uc(t− 1)/(βuc(t))]
+θ∗t [·] + ...}.
I have omitted showing explicitly the foreign household’s budget constraint and first-order con-
ditions, these are subsumed into the shorthand +θ∗t [·] + ... I use the same first-order conditions
as before to show that optimal steady state capital taxes are generally non-zero. The first-order
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conditions of the other capital choice variables (for example a or k∗) do not reveal additional in-
formation, as the system is over-identified in steady state and outcomes depend on initial capital
holdings. Therefore, I do not show these additional conditions here.
kt|t>0 : ψt[ntτnt
∂wt
∂kt
+ τkt rt + τ
k
t kt
∂rt
∂kt
] (37)
+ θt[nt(1− τnt )
∂wt
∂kt
+ [1 + rt(1− τkt )] + kt(1− τkt )
∂rt
∂kt
] + µtuc(t)(1− τnt )
∂wt
∂kt
+ ζt(1− τkt )
∂rt
∂kt
+ θ∗t k
∗
t (1− τk∗t )
∂rt
∂kt
+ γ∗t (1− τk∗t )
∂rt
∂kt
= θt−1/β
τkt|t>0 : ψt(rtkt + r
∗
t at) = ζtrt + γtr
∗
t + θtktrt + θtatr
∗
t (38)
τnt : ψtwtnt = µtuc(t)wt + θtntwt. (39)
As evident from the two capital accumulation constraints in (36), gross capital returns will
always be equal across countries. Hence, net capital returns and thus taxes will be equal in steady
state, when gross returns in different countries are equal. Therefore, I convert r∗ into r and τk∗
into τk. Dropping time subscripts, replacing 1/β with 1 + r(1− τk) and combining, one obtains
τk =
[(γ − γ∗) + ψ(k∗ − a) + (aθ − k∗θ∗)] ∂rt∂kt
ψr + [(γ − γ∗) + (aθ − k∗θ∗)− ψa] ∂rt∂kt
. (40)
In a symmetric world, k∗ = a, but the Lagrange multipliers for a domestic and foreign constraint,
e.g. γ vs. γ∗ and θ vs. θ∗, will generally not be equal. To see this, taking the derivative with
respect to ct and c
∗
t shows that both influence the incentive compatibility conditions for working
and saving (i.e. the constraints with multipliers µ, ζ, and γ or their equivalents abroad), but only
the former affects utility directly. In other words, resources abroad are only valued insofar as they
affect prices and hence incentives. Symmetry allows to simplify equation (40) to
τk =
[(γ − γ∗) + (aθ − k∗θ∗)] ∂rt∂kt
ψr + [(γ − γ∗) + (aθ − k∗θ∗)− ψa] ∂rt∂kt
. (41)
Residential capital taxes are thus generally not zero in steady state. They depend among others
on the distribution of assets (how much is invested abroad, a and k∗) and the impact that one
country has on the worldwide rate of return (∂rt/∂kt). γ and γ
∗ are the Lagrange multipliers for
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the household’s Euler equation concerning investment abroad. In the limiting cases of a small open
economy or closed economy, taxes are zero again. For a closed economy, it is simply the common
Chamley-Judd result; there is no foreign country and no assets abroad to invest in, so in equation
(41) γ = γ∗ = 0 and a = k∗ = 0. For a small open economy, optimal capital taxes also have to
be zero18; it follows from the fact that ∂rt/∂kt = 0, as r = r
∗ from the no-arbitrage condition
and r∗ is fixed from the small country’s perspective. This had been shown by Correia (1996a) in a
model where the rest of the world is not explicitly modeled. The results can be summarized in the
following proposition:
Proposition 8 With residential taxation, steady-state capital taxes are generally non-zero in a
symmetric large open economy equilibrium. In the limiting cases of a closed and a small open
economy, steady-state capital taxes are optimally zero.
4.2 Hybrid System
Let τst denote corporate taxes, i.e. taxes that are paid by firms in the country where they produce.
τkt is the residential tax, which will be levied on all net capital income of residents, regardless of
where it is invested. The planner’s problem is thus
L =
∞∑
t=0
βt{u(ct, lt) (42)
+ψt[τ
s
t rtKt + τ
k
t rt(1− τst )kt + τkt r∗t (1− τs∗t )at + τnt wtnt − gt]
+θt[(1− τnt )wtnt + kt[1 + rt(1− τst )(1− τkt )]− kt+1 + at[1 + r∗t (1− τs∗t )(1− τkt )]− at+1 − ct]
+µt[uc(t)(1− τnt )wt − ul(t)]
+ζt|t>0[(rt(1− τst )(1− τkt ) + 1)−
uc(t− 1)
βuc(t)
]
+γt|t>0[(r∗t (1− τs∗t )(1− τkt ) + 1)−
uc(t− 1)
βuc(t)
]
+θ∗t [·] + ...}.
18With two symmetric countries, there is of course no small open economy. However, the model can be easily
expanded to any number of countries. For a small open economy, let the number of countries go to infinity. The
impact of each country on the world interest rate then is zero.
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The tax system is complete in the sense that all domestic factor returns are subject to taxation,
so combining the first-order conditions for kt, τ
s
t and τ
n
t is equivalent to taking the derivative with
respect to kt and taking prices as given:
kt|t>0 : ψtτst rt + ψtτ
k
t rt(1− τst ) + θt[1 + rt(1− τst )(1− τkt )] = θt−1/β. (43)
In steady state, one can eliminate time subscripts and substitute for β to obtain
(τs + τk − τsτk)rψ = 0. (44)
Therefore, effective taxes on domestic capital are zero: 1+r(1−τs)(1−τk) = 1+r. Each component
is not necessarily zero, although τk = τs = 0 is of course a solution.
The problem remains that residential taxes around the world have to be equal in steady state,
in order to satisfy the no-arbitrage conditions. If that tax rate is non-zero, then the domestic
corporate tax will not be zero in steady state, either. If the global residential tax is positive, then
it is optimal to introduce a negative corporate tax, and vice versa.
Proposition 9 With both residential and source-based taxation, the tax distortion on capital re-
turns is zero, i.e. (1− τs)(1− τk) = 1.
5 Conclusion
This paper presents a framework to analyze optimal capital taxation with perfect commitment
in large open economies. With a territorial system, in which taxes are paid where the capital is
employed, optimal capital taxes are zero in the long run. The result is the same as in a comparable
closed economy of a representative infinitely lived dynasty. This is robust to introducing barriers
to capital mobility and heterogeneity in agents’ initial wealth and labor productivity as well as
non-linear labor taxes.
In a residential system, in which capital taxes are paid where the owner resides, capital taxes
are generally not zero, except in the limiting cases of a closed and a small open economy. With
residential taxes, not all factors of production can be taxed independently, notably domestic capital
investment of foreign agents. In a hybrid system with both residential and territorial taxes, all
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factors are taxable once more and the zero capital-tax result is restored. This underlines the
importance of a complete tax system for the Chamley-Judd result.
Some extensions to the presented model come to mind. If taxes were optimally non-zero in
a closed economy, say because of firm profits or due to overlapping generations as in Erosa and
Gervais (2002), then would a race to the bottom ensue? How does productive infrastructure spend-
ing influence tax competition? Although there is a huge literature on this subject already, most
models feature an exogenously given capital stock. I analyze tax competition with endogenous
capital accumulation in a separate paper, Gross (2012). Furthermore, one could study the impli-
cations of aggregate fluctuations on optimal fiscal policy in an open economy, extending the work
of Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1994) and Farhi (2010). The computational challenges would be
considerable, though.
Another venue of research is to look at labor mobility. A somewhat philosophical problem arises
here, though, as it is no longer clear whose utility a benevolent government would maximize: the
utility of its citizens, no matter whether they migrate or not; the utility of all people living in its
jurisdiction; the utility of its citizens as long as they stay in the country etc. Whatever it is, it
would be interesting to see whether the zero capital tax result still holds and what optimal taxes
on labor would be in such an environment.
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A Appendix
A.1 Consumption Taxes and the Primal Approach
In this appendix, I examine two questions simultaneously: How can one think of the primal approach
in a large open economy and what is the impact of consumption taxes on optimal capital tax policy?
The primal approach is not as useful here as it is in a closed economy, since many of the prices and
taxes cannot be eliminated. However, it still serves the purpose to illustrate that the availability of
consumption taxes does not affect results. I maintain the assumption of source-based or territorial
capital taxation, but results easily transfer to a system of world-wide or residential capital taxation.
Consider an economy as presented in section two, except that the government can now introduce
consumption taxes. The household’s per-period budget constraint (2) and the government budget
constraint (10) change to
ct(1 + τ
c
t ) =(1− τnt )wtnt + [1 + (1− τkt )rt]kt − kt+1 (45)
+ [1 + (1− τk∗t )r∗t ]at − at+1 + (1 +Rt)bt − bt+1
gt + bt(1 +Rt) =τ
t
cct + τ
k
t rtKt + τ
n
t wtnt + bt+1. (46)
The household’s optimality conditions, equations (4) to (6), along with the optimality condition
for government bonds, then become
ul(t) =uc(t)(1− τnt )wt/(1 + τ ct ) (47)
uc(t)/(1 + τ
c
t ) =βuc(t+ 1)[(1− τkt+1)rt+1 + 1]/(1 + τ ct+1) (48)
uc(t)/(1 + τ
c
t ) =βuc(t+ 1)[(1− τk∗t )r∗t+1 + 1]/(1 + τ ct+1) (49)
uc(t)/(1 + τ
c
t ) =βuc(t+ 1)(1 +Rt+1)/(1 + τ
c
t+1). (50)
First, replace (1 − τkt+1)rt+1 and (1 − τk∗t )r∗t+1 by Rt+1 in the household’s per-period budget
constraint. Then one can use equation (45) to isolate bt+1 and substitute for it (eliminating bt+1
as a choice variable and rendering the household’s per-period budget constraint obsolete). This
results in an intertemporal budget constraint for the household and a national resource constraint
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for every period t from the government budget constraint (46):
(b0 + k0)(1 + (1− τk0 )r0) + a0(1 + (1− τk∗0 )r∗0)
1 +R0
=
∞∑
t=0
ct(1 + τ
c
t )− (1− τnt )wtnt∏t
i=0(1 +Ri)
(51)
Ft(K,n) + kt − kt+1 + at(1 + r∗t (1− τk∗t ))− at+1 − k∗t rt(1− τkt ) = ct + gt. (52)
Now one can eliminate Rt+1 and τ
n
t from the problem by substituting in from equations (50)
and (47) (which thereby become obsolete) into (51) to obtain the conventional implementability
constraint:
[(b0 + k0)(1 + (1− τk0 )r0) + a0(1 + (1− τk∗0 )r∗0)]uc(0)
1 + τ c0
=
∞∑
t=0
βt(uc(t)ct + un(t)nt). (53)
Finally, use equation (48) to eliminate τ ct+1 from the problem. This leaves the no-arbitrage
condition for every period t:
(1− τkt+1)rt+1 = (1− τk∗t )r∗t+1. (54)
The government’s set of constraints now consists of the implementability constraint (53), the
national resource constraint (52) and no-arbitrage condition (54) for every period, plus the com-
petitive equilibrium conditions for foreign agents. The choice variables bt+1, τ
n
t , and τ
c
t+1 were
eliminated. Note that none of the variables eliminated are present in the foreign competitive equi-
librium conditions. One cannot follow the same approach for the foreign agent, since none of the
eliminated variables’ foreign counterparts are choice variables.
What is the impact of the availability of consumption taxes on the optimal tax policy? The
problem presented here with an implementability constraint clearly shows that consumption taxes
do not change the problem except for consumption taxes at time zero. This is the same result as in
a closed economy: consumption taxes at time zero represent another opportunity to tax the initial
capital stock; apart from that, consumption taxes are irrelevant.
Even though I have only shown it for a territorial tax system, the same is true for a residential tax
system. Theoretically, having consumption taxes would allow residential capital taxes to be different
across countries in steady state. However, this would require constantly increasing consumption
taxes. If one imposes limits on labor income or consumption taxes, then consumption taxes have
to be constant in steady state and capital taxes have to equalize across countries.
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A.2 Proof: Mixed-strategy Equilibria
Assume that the foreign country is believed to play a mixed strategy consisting of I different
elements, played with a probability pii > 0, such that
∑
I pii = 1. As shown in the main section of
the paper, the best response to any single one of the elements of the other country’s mixed strategy
is to set steady-state capital taxes to zero. I prove now that this is also true in expectation for any
foreign mixed strategy.
The government’s problem is now to maximize expected lifetime utility of its agents,
∑
I piiLi,
where Li is the Lagrangian as in section 2.2 extended to include the foreign government’s budget
constraint per period (and with foreign labor taxes as an additional choice variable), as outlined in
section 3.4. The set of control variables is then
X = {{ct,i, c∗t,i, nt,i, n∗t,i, kt+1,i, k∗t+1,i, at+1,i, a∗t+1,i, bt+1, τkt+1, τnt,i, τn∗t,i }Ii=1}∞t=0. (55)
The control variables bt+1 and τ
k
t+1 have to be the same for each element of the other country’s
mixed strategy, but the response of household consumption to domestic policy depends on foreign
policy (which is observed when households make their choices). As pointed out before, labor
taxes have to adjust, otherwise the government budget constraint would not hold (and thus violate
feasibility). The relevant first-order conditions are
kt|t>0,i : ψt,iτkt rt,i + ψt,iτ
k
t Kt,i
∂rt,i
∂kt,i
− ψt,ibt(1− τkt )
∂rt,i
∂kt,i
+ ψt,iτ
n
t,int,i
∂wt,i
∂kt,i
+ θt,i[1 + (1− τkt )rt,i]+
θt,i(1− τkt )kt,i
∂rt,i
∂kt,i
+ θt,i(1− τnt,i)nt,i
∂wt,i
∂kt,i
+ θt,ibt(1− τkt )
∂rt,i
∂kt,i
+ θ∗t,i/χk
∗
t,i(1− τkt )
∂rt,i
∂kt,i
+ µt,iuc(t, i)(1− τnt,i)
∂wt,i
∂kt,i
+ ζt,i(1− τkt )
∂rt,i
∂kt,i
+ γ∗t,i(1− τkt )
∂rt,i
∂kt,i
= θt−1,i/β, (56)
τnt,i : ψt,int,iwt,i = µt,iuc(t, i)wt,i + θt,int,iwt,i, (57)
τkt|t>0 :
∑
I
pii(ψt,iKt,irt,i + ψt,ibtrt,i
− (θt,ikt,irt,i + θt,ibtrt,i + θ∗t,i/χk∗t,irt,i + ζt,irt,i + γ∗t,irt,i)) = 0. (58)
Considering the steady state, I drop time subscripts. Furthermore, I substitute 1 + (1 − τk)ri for
1/β, which has to hold in any steady state, into equation (56). Equation (57) can be divided by
wt,i and then µt,iuc(t, i) can be substituted into equation (56). Next I multiply that equation by
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ri and pii, divide it by ∂ri/∂ki,
19 and sum over all i. One can then use equation (58), multiplied
by 1− τk, to substitute in for ∑piiζiri(1− τk) and obtain
∑
I
piiψi
ri
∂ri/∂ki
(
τkri + ni
∂wi
∂ki
+Ki
∂ri
∂ki
)
= 0 (59)
As before, ∂w/∂k = Fnk and ∂r/∂k = Fkk. Due to constant returns to scale, Fnkn = −FkkK, so
τk
∑
I piiψir
2
i ∂ri/∂ki = 0, which implies that τ
k = 0, since pii, ψi, ri > 0 and ∂ri/∂ki < 0 for all
i. Therefore, no matter what the foreign country’s strategy is, the home country will always select
zero capital taxes in the long run, including mixed strategies.
A.3 Proof: Adjustment Costs
Let the adjustment cost function be twice continuously differentiable and in the home economy be
given by Z(1− kt+1/kt) and abroad by Y (1− at+1/at), where each function reaches its respective
minimum when kt+1 = kt and at+1 = at. An agent who seeks to shift capital from one country to
another thus faces the cost of reducing the capital stock in one place plus the cost of increasing it
in the other place.
The household’s budget constraint then becomes
ct =(1− τnt )wtnt + [1 + (1− τkt )rt]kt − kt+1 − Z(kt, kt+1)+ (60)
[1 + (1− τk∗t )r∗t ]at − at+1 − Y (at, at+1).
As apparent from section two, government bonds do not affect the result, so to keep notation as
simple as possible, I have removed them. The household’s first-order conditions change accordingly
19The production function is assumed to be well-behaved, i.e. that Fkk < 0 for all K > 0 and n > 0.
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and the planner’s modified Lagrangean is
L =
∞∑
t=0
βt{u(ct, lt) (61)
+ψt[τ
k
t rtKt + τ
n
t wtnt − gt]
+θt[(1− τnt )wtnt + [1 + (1− τkt )rt]kt − kt+1 − Z(kt, kt+1)+
[1 + (1− τk∗t )r∗t ]at − at+1 − Y (at, at+1)− ct]
+µt[uc(t)(1− τnt )wt − ul(t)]
+ζt|t>0[(1 + rt(1− τkt )− Zkt(kt, kt+1))uc(t)− (1 + Zkt(kt−1, kt))uc(t− 1)/β]
+γt|t>0[(1 + r∗t (1− τk∗t )− Yat(at, at+1))uc(t)− (1 + Yat(at−1, at))uc(t− 1)/β]
+θ∗t [·] + ...}.
I have omitted showing explicitly the foreign household’s budget constraint and first-order condi-
tions, these are subsumed into the shorthand +θ∗t [·]+... As shown before, when taking the first-order
conditions with respect to kt+1, τ
k
t and τ
n
t , the terms with second-order derivatives cancel out (the
effect of a change in k on w and r), so I will use the first-order condition for kt+1, taking prices as
given:
kt+1 : − ζtZktkt(kt, kt+1)uc(t)− ζtZktkt(kt−1, kt)uc(t− 1)/β (62)
− ζt−1Zkt−1kt(kt−1, kt)uc(t− 1)/β − ζt+1Zktkt+1(kt, kt+1)uc(t)
+ ψtτ
k
t rt + θtrt(1 + (1− τkt )− Zkt(kt, kt+1)) = θt−1(1 + Zkt(kt−1, kt))/β.
In steady state, k is independent of the time dimension, as are the other variables and Lagrange
multipliers. The second and cross derivatives of the adjustment cost function with respect to
today’s (x) and tomorrow’s capital (y) satisfy Zyy = Zxx = −Zxy. Moreover, Zx = Zy = 0, since
the function reaches its minimum in steady state when x = y. Equation (62) then simplifies to
ψτkr + θ(1 + r(1− τk)) = θ/β. (63)
In steady state, 1/β = 1 + r(1− τk), so optimally ψτkr = 0. In fact, any adjustment cost function
that satisfies the properties Zyy = Zxx = −Zxy and Zx = Zy, which I call symmetric, leads to zero
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capital taxes. Even when the first derivative is not zero in steady state, then equation (63) becomes
ψτkr+θ(1+(1−τk)r−Zk) = θ(1+Zk)/β. In this case 1/β is equal to (1+r(1−τk)−Zk)/(1−Zk),
so as before ψrτk = 0.
A.4 Proof: Heterogeneous Agents and Non-linear Taxes
There are I different types of agents of unit mass each in every country,20 with time-independent,
finite and strictly positive labor productivity xi ∈ [x, x] per hour worked, and initial capital holdings
ki0. I assume an interior solution, i.e. that all household’s labor decisions are in the interval (0, 1).
This can be guaranteed by choosing an appropriate utility function or parameter values.21
A household of type i has the following budget constraint
cit = k
i
t(1 + rt(1− τkt ))− kit+1 + ait(1 + r∗t (1− τk∗t ))− ait+1 (64)
+ bit(1 +Rt)− bit+1 + nitxiwt −
∑
J
τnt,j(n
i
tx
iwt)
j .
The household’s first-order conditions change accordingly. The government’s budget constraint is
τkt rtKt +Bt+1 −Bt(1 +Rt)− gt +
∑
I
∑
J
τnt,j(n
i
tx
iwt)
j = 0, (65)
where K is the total capital stock employed in the home country, i.e. the sum of domestic capital
holdings over all agents at home and abroad, similarly for total government debt B. Implicit in the
formulation above is the assumption that wages are paid per efficiency unit of labor.
Let αi denote the planner’s utility function (increasing and concave) when individuals of type i
obtain utility u(cit, n
i
t). As above, I do not show explicitly the foreign household’s budget constraint
20It is easy to incorporate different sizes for each type, but it clogs up notation and does not yield any additional
insights.
21A caveat worth mentioning is the case of log-utility. As Lansing (1999) has shown, a “capitalist” class that does
not work (complemented by a working class that does not save) and has log-utility can be taxed at will. Since income
and substitution effects cancel each other out, their savings decision is independent of the tax on capital. In this
paper, everybody is allowed to work and save, though, so Lansing’s limiting case does not apply here.
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and first-order conditions. The planner’s problem is
L =
∞∑
t=0
βt{
∑
I
αi(u(cit, n
i
t)) (66)
+ψt
[
τkt rtKt +
∑
I
∑
J
τnt,j(n
i
tx
i
twt)
j −Bt(1 + rt(1− τkt )) +Bt+1 − gt
]
+
∑
I
θit[k
i
t(1 + rt(1− τkt ))− kit+1 + ait(1 + rt(1− τk∗t ))− ait+1+
bit(1 + rt(1− τkt ))− bit+1 − cit + nitxiwt −
∑
J
τnt,j(n
i
tx
iwt)
j ]
+
∑
I
µit
[
uic(t)(wtx
i
tn
i
t −
∑
J
τnt,jj(wtx
i
tn
i
t)
j) + uin(t)n
i
t
]
+
∑
I
ζit|t>0
[
(rt(1− τkt ) + 1)−
uic(t− 1)
βuic(t)
]
+
∑
I
γit|t>0
[
(r∗t (1− τk∗t ) + 1)−
uic(t− 1)
βuic(t)
]
+
∗∑
I
θi∗t [·] + ...}.
In the following, I will drop time subscripts in order to keep the notation as simple as possible.
Since I am only concerned with steady state solutions, it comes without loss of generality. The
relevant first-order conditions are
τnj :
∑
I
θi(nixiw)j +
∑
I
µiu
i
cj(n
ixiw)j = ψ
∑
I
(nixiw)j (67)
τk :
∑
I
θi(ki + bi)r +
∑
I∗
θ∗ik∗ir +
∑
I
ζir +
∑
I∗
γi∗r = r(K +B)ψ (68)
ki :
∑
I
θi
(
(ki + bi)(1− τk)∂r
∂k
+ nixi
∂w
∂k
−
∑
J
τnj j(n
ixiw)j
∂w
∂k
/w
)
(69)
+ ψ
(
τkr + τkK
∂r
∂k
−B(1− τk)∂r
∂k
+
∑
I
∑
J
τnj j(n
ixiw)j
∂w
∂k
/w
)
+
∑
I
µiuic
∂w
∂k
/w
(
nixiw −
∑
J
τnj j
2(nixiw)j
)
+
∑
I
ζi(1− τk)∂r
∂k
+
∑
I∗
θi∗ki∗(1− τk)∂r
∂k
+
∑
I∗
γi∗(1− τk)∂r
∂k
+ θi(1 + r(1− τk)) = θi/β.
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Conditions (67) and (69) hold for all j and i respectively. Combining equations (68) and (69) and
substituting for 1/β = (1 + r(1− τk)) yields:
∑
I
θi
(
nixi
∂w
∂k
−
∑
J
τnj j(n
ixiw)j
∂w
∂k
/w
)
(70)
+ ψ
(
τkr +K
∂r
∂k
+
∑
I
∑
J
τnj j(n
ixiw)j
∂w
∂k
/w
)
+
∑
I
µiuic
∂w
∂k
/w
(
nixiw −
∑
J
τnj j
2(nixiw)j
)
= 0.
Taking condition (67) for j = 1 and using the fact that
∑
I n
ixi ∂w∂k = −K ∂r∂k by constant returns
to scale, (70) simplifies to:
ψτkr + ψ
∑
I
∑
J
τnj j(n
ixiw)j
∂w
∂k
/w (71)
=
∑
I
∑
J
θiτnj j(n
ixiw)j
∂w
∂k
/w +
∑
I
∑
J
µiuicτ
n
j j
2(nixiw)j
∂w
∂k
/w.
Now take condition (67) and multiply by jτnj and then sum over j. Substituting this into (71)
eliminates all terms but one:
ψτkr = 0. (72)
Hence, capital income taxes in steady state are zero, even when allowing for heterogeneity among
agents and non-linear taxes on labor income.
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